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CONTRACTS
I. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
In La-Z-Boy Chair Co. v. Hinds,' La-Z-Boy brought suit in
diversity against Hinds to recover monies due on an account for
the sale of chairs. Hinds answered that he had returned ninety
chairs to La-Z-Boy, and that pursuant to an agreement between
the parties, the acceptance of the chairs constituted an accord
and satisfaction. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment under
Rule 56,2 but the district court found no genuine issue of fact, and
held that as a matter of law the return of chairs did not operate
as an accord and satisfaction.
La-Z-Boy Chair Company sold and delivered approximately
$60,000 worth of chairs to Hinds, who did business as Hinds Fur-
niture Company from February 1972 until May 1973. Hinds al-
leged that after he had received the chairs, he and a salesman for
La-Z-Boy had orally agreed that the return of ninety chairs val-
ued at about $10,000 would satisfy the entire debt.' The chairs
were returned to La-Z-Boy but, as a result, Hinds had to close his
business because his stock in trade was depleted below opera-
tional levels. Hinds claimed that the detriment to him in being
forced to close his business was sufficient consideration to support
the accord and satisfaction.
The court stated that two of the prerequisites to a valid ac-
cord and satisfaction are a dispute between the parties about
their duties under the original contract4 and a meeting of the
minds concerning the substituted performance that would dis-
charge their obligations.5 Since Hinds admitted that prior to the
return of the chairs there was no disagreement about the money
owed La-Z-Boy, there was no issue of fact about a dispute be-
tween the parties. The court simply dismissed Hinds' claim that
the burden on him in going out of business was consideration to
La-Z-Boy by saying that his claim "would be true, and perhaps
1. 364 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1973).
2. FEO. R. Civ. P. 56.
3. No reasons were given in the opinion to explain why La-Z-Boy might accept
$10,000 worth of chairs in satisfaction of Hinds' $60,000 debt.
4. The court found that there was no dispute over "the validity of any of the claims
of the original demand, the liability of the debtor or the amount due." 364 F. Supp. 33,
35 (D.S.C. 1973).
5. Id. at 36-37.
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apropos, if initially there were a dispute between the parties. 6
Relying primarily on Hinds' testimony concerning his conversa-
tions with the salesman,7 the court further held there was no
actual agreement that the returned chairs would satisfy Hinds'
debt.'
A close reading of the district court opinion reveals that the
trial judge misinterpreted the South Carolina law on accord and
satisfaction. Citing Corpus Juris Secundum as primary authority,
the court concluded that a dispute or controversy between the
litigants over their prior obligations is a necessary element to
every accord and satisfaction.9 However, an analysis of South
Carolina case law and the historical background of accord and
satisfaction does not support this conclusion.
According to the generally accepted common law doctrine,
consideration is needed to support an accord and satisfaction.'"
The pre-existing duty rule states that performance of a duty owed
to someone is not adequate consideration to make a contract with
him enforceable." Thus it became widely held that partial pay-
ment of a debt cannot be in satisfaction of the whole debt even if
the parties had agreed that partial payment would release the
debtor from his entire obligation.' 2 Courts in South Carolina and
some other jurisdictions, however, felt that this rule defeated fair
dealing and honesty."' To enforce the creditor's promise to receive
6. Id. at 36.
7. "The nebulous claim upon which defendant relies is obvious from the testimony
of Hinds, emphasizing that there was no meeting of the minds: (p. 11 Tr.)
A. Well, he [salesman] told me that he would see to it that the debt was
wiped out.
Q. Well, how was he going to do that, Mr. Hinds?
A. I don't know that."
Id. at 37.
8. The court also implied, but did not specifically find, that the salesman had no
actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement. The court mentioned the fact
that Hinds knew that the agent with whom he was dealing was "only a salesman." Id.
9. Id. at 36.
10. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1276 (1 vol. ed. 1952) (hereinafter cited as CORBIN); 15
S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1851 (3d ed. 1957) (hereinafter cited as WILLISTON).
11. CORBIN § 171; Marion Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 221-S.C. 172, 69 S.E.2d
705 (1952); Rabon v. State Finance Corp., 203 S.C. 183, 26 S.E.2d 501 (1943).
12. See CORBIN §§ 175, 1281; 1 WILISTON § 120; Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 80,
64 S.E. 513, 514 (1909); Arnold v. Bailey, 24 S.C. 493, 496 (1885); Hope v. Johnston, 11
Rich. 135, 137 (S.C. 1857).
13. See Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 80, 64 S.E. 513, 514 (1909); Riggs v. Home Mut.
Fire Protection Ass'n, 61 S.C. 448, 456-57, 39 S.E. 614, 617 (1901); Bolt v. Dawkins, 16
S.C. 198, 214-15 (1881); Hope v. Johnston, 11 Rich. 135, 138 (S.C. 1857) (dissenting
opinion). See also CORBIN § 1284 at 1053-54; 1 WILLISTON § 120 at 502-05.
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less than the amount due as satisfaction of the debtor's obliga-
tion, courts searched for differences between the actual perform-
ance rendered by the debtor and his pre-existing duty." Consider-
ation was found, for example, when there was payment of a lesser
amount a day before the full obligation was due, 5 payment of a
lesser amount at a place other than that agreed to in the con-
tract,", or payment of an amount less than the debt to the creditor
by a third party.' 7 Courts also found consideration when the
debtor did not pay the creditor money but gave him something
else instead; 8 they did not inquire whether the substituted per-
formance was equal in value to the original debt.19 When the
original debt or claim was disputed or unliquidated,2 there was
consideration in the debtor's payment of more than he felt was
due.2 ' Although the sum paid was less than the creditor claimed,
the pre-existing duty rule did not defeat the debtor's plea of ac-
cord and satisfaction because the prior duty owed by the debtor
was controverted or unclear.
22
The district court was not correct in asserting that a dispute
is always a prerequisite to an accord and satisfaction. A dispute
merely made the pre-existing duty rule inapplicable to the facts
in a given case.2 3 If there was no dispute between the parties, the
debtor could still avoid the effects of the rule by pointing to
something else in his performance that differed from his pre-
existing duty.2 Even the authorities cited by the court do not
14. CORBIN § 1284; Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 80, 64 S.E. 513, 514 (1909).
15. CORBIN § 1282. See, e.g., Hope v. Johnston, 11 Rich. 135, 138 (S.C. 1857); Eve
v. Mosely, 2 Strob. 203, 205-06 (S.C. 1847).
16. CORBIN § 1282. See, e.g., Hope v. Johnston, 11 Rich. 135, 138 (S.C. 1857).
17. CORBIN § 1285; Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 64 S.E. 513 (1909).
18. CoRBIN § 1284. See, e.g., Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 80, 64 S.E. 513, 514 (1909);
Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S.C. 198, 214-15 (1881); Hope v. Johnston, 11 Rich. 135, 137 (S.C.
1857); Eve v. Mosely, 2 Strob. 203, 205 (S.C. 1847).
19. CORBN § 1284. See, e.g., Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 80, 64 S.E. 513, 514 (1909);
Arnold v. Bailey, 24 S.C. 493, 496 (1885); Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S.C. 198, 214-15 (1881);
Pierce, Butler & Co. v. Jones & Son, 8 S.C. 273, 279 (1876).
20. An unliquidated debt is one that has not been set by agreement or is not capable
of being determined by the court. 1 WILLISTON § 128.
21. CORBIN §§ 187-88. See, e.g., Taylor v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 196 S.C. 195,
201-02, 12 S.E.2d 708, 710-11 (1940); Riggs v. Home Mut. Fire Protection Ass'n, 61 S.C.
448, 457, 39 S.E. 614, 617-18 (1900).
22. See note 21 supra; CORBIN § 1278. An accord and satisfaction is an agreement
for the settlement of a previous claim by substituted performance and the actual rendering
of the performance. When the prior claim is in doubt or in dispute, some courts label the
transaction a "compromise and settlement." Many courts, including those of South Caro-
lina, do not use a different label when the prior claim is disputed. See CORBIN § 1278.
23. See notes 21-22 supra.
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support its conclusion. The court quoted Corpus Juris Secundum
for the "general and better rule. ' 25 The quote, however, when
read in context, does not stand for the proposition that a dispute
is a necessary element of every accord and satisfaction. 21 In fact
the sub-heading of the section quoted reads: "It is not essential
to the validity of an accord and satisfaction that the claim be in
dispute or controversy, except where there is no other or addi-
tional consideration to support the new agreement."
Furthermore, Mixson v. Rossiter21 and Dunaway v. United
Insurance Co. of America,2 relied on by the court, do not imply
that South Carolina is in agreement with the "general and better
rule." In Mixson the appellant claimed that the lower court was
in error in not holding that there had been an accord and satisfac-
tion in his payment to the respondent of a sum less than the
amount which the respondent claimed was due." The appellant
contended that there was a dispute as to the original amount of
the debt, but the court disposed of the appeal by finding that
there had actually been no dispute over the amount due.-' The
appellant did not claim that there had been any consideration
other than the settlement of the alleged dispute; therefore, the
court did not have to address any further issues concerning con-
sideration. In Dunaway the appellant claimed that the respon-
dent's payment of an amount less than that which was due did
not operate as an accord and satisfaction.3 2 The court, rejecting
that claim without citing any authority or explaining in any de-
tail the elements of an accord and satisfaction, stated that the
25. The judge quoted the following from 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 2 at 467
(1936) (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, it is now sometimes laid down as a general rule that it is essential to
the making of a valid accord and satifaction that there be a bona fide dispute
or controversy between the parties, an actual and substantial difference of opin-
ions as to either the validity of the demand, the liability of the debtor, or the
amount due from him, or at least that the claim or demand be unliquidiated.
Clearly this is true where the accord and satisfaction consists in the giving and
acceptance of a less sum of money than claimed, nothing more, for in such case,
as elsewhere appears in § 4 infra, the only consideration is the mutual conces-
sion of the parties.
364 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D.S.C. 1973).
26. 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 2 (1936).
27. Id. at 466.
28. 223 S.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 46 (1953).
29. 239 S.C. 407, 123 S.E.2d 353 (1962).
30. 223 S.C. 47, 53, 74 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1953).
31. Id,
32. 239 S.C. 407, 414, 123 S.E.2d 353, 356i(1953).
[Vol. 26
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principle relied on by the appellant applied only to undisputed
claims, but that the amount due in the claim before the court had
been disputed.3 3 Read against the background of prior South Car-
olina case law, neither case can be said fairly to imply that a
dispute over the prior claim or debt is a prerequisite to every
accord and satisfaction.
Even correctly interpreted, however, the common law of ac-
cord and satisfaction should not have been applied to this case.
A contract for the sale of chairs is a transaction within the pur-
view of article two of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 Neverthe-
less, neither attorney appears to have argued for application of
the UCC and the court did not base its opinion on the Code. No
section of the UCC is entitled "Accord and Satisfaction," 35 but
the provision relating to the modification of contracts" is section
10.2-209 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. 7 The purpose of this
section is to remove the technicalities that hamper modification
of sales contracts.38 The drafters of the Code felt that one of these
technicalities in particular, the pre-existing duty rule, created an
33. Id.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-102 (Spec. Supp. 1966) states that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-Sales applies to "transactions in goods." Goods are defined at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10.2-105(1) (Spec. Supp. 1966) as "all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities .. .and things in action."
35. One of the purposes of the UCC was to "simplify, clarify and modernize" the law
of commercial transactions and some of the familiar terms of common law contracts have
not been included in the Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-102(2)(a) (Spec. Supp. 1966).
36. An accord and satisfaction is in effect the same thing as an agreement to modify
the contract (accord) and performance in compliance with the terms of the agreement
(satisfaction). See CORBIN § 1276. In Hinds it was not disputed that the chairs had been
returned as requested, but there was a dispute as to whether there had been a valid
agreement to modify the contract.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-209 (Spec. Supp. 1966):
Modification, recission and waiver.-(1) An agreement modifying a contract
w;ithin this Title needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or recission except by a
signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be
separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Title (§ 10.2-201)
must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the
requirement of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the con-
tract may retract the waiver by reasonable notifcation received by the other
party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the
retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance
on the waiver.
38. Official Comment 1 to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-209 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
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especially harsh and uncommercial result in the setting of mod-
ern sales transactions.39 The first provision of section 10.2-209 not
only eliminates the detrimental effects of this rule but also elimi-
nates entirely the consideration requirement for modification
agreements." Under present law any modification agreed to in
good faith" would be enforceable.4 2 Therefore in Hinds neither the
court nor the defense attorneys should have been trying to find
consideration for the modification or looking for a dispute be-
tween the parties; they should have inquired into the reasons that
might have prompted the parties to make such an agreement.
Nevertheless, if the UCC had been consulted, the district
court might not have decided the case differently. Section 10.2-
209(1) does require that there be an "agreement" to modify the
contract, and the court in Hinds specifically found that there was
no meeting of the minds between Hinds and La-Z-Boy. 3 The
required agreement is defined as "the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other cir-
cumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course
of performance as provided in this act."" In finding that there
was no actual agreement, the court relied on the language of the
parties" and no facts which could be helpful in determining
39. South Carolina Reporter's Comment to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-209 (Spec. Supp.
1966).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-209(1) (Spec. Supp. 1966). See also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-107 (Spec. Supp. 1966) which provides: "Any claim or right arising out of
an alleged breach can be discharged in whole or in part without consideration by waiver
or renunciation."
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-203 (Spec. Supp. 1966) imposes an obligation of good
faith on the performance or enforcement of every contract or duty within the UCC. "Good
faith" for merchants is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-103(1)(b)
(Spec. Supp. 1966).
42, There are apparently no South Carolina cases applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-
209 (Spec. Supp. 1966). As an example of a court upholding a good faith agreement to
reduce the price of goods see Gulf Chemical and Metallurgical Corp. v. Sylvan Chemical
Corp., 122 N.J. Super. 499, 300 A.2d 878 (1973). See also Hawkland, Major Changes Under
the Uniform Commercial Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAC.
LAW. 73, 76 (May 1964).
43. 364 F. Supp. 33, 36-37 (D.S.C. 1973).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-201(3) (Spec. Supp. 1966).
45. 364 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.S.C. 1973). Section 10.2-209(3) does require that a modifi-
cation agreement comply with the UCC statute of frauds provisions. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10.2-201(3)(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides that a contract not complying with the
statute of frauds "but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . . . with respect to
goods . . . which have been received and accepted." Since suit was brought after Hinds
had accepted the chairs from La-Z-Boy and after La-Z-Boy had accepted the returned
chairs, the UCC's statute of frauds provisions would not have been a bar to Hinds.
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/4
CONTRACTS
"other circumstances," such as course of dealing or usage of
trade, were mentioned in the opinion.46 Without such additional
information, speculation as to a difference in outcome is not pos-
sible.
II. ACTION FOR FRAUD AND DEcEIT
Stevens v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.47 involves an action
brought by Stevens for fraud and deceit in Plantation Pipe Line's
procurement of a right-of-way for a pipe line across plaintiffs
land. The lower court granted Plantation's motion for nonsuit,
holding that the evidence was not sufficient to raise a question
for the jury. On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded for a new trial.
After negotiations between the parties, Plantation's agent
presented to Stevens for her signature mimeographed forms con-
taining the grant of a right-of-way and a release. After reading the
forms, plaintiff objected to the provision in the release relieving
Plantation of any liability for damages that might occur to her
land. The agent then inserted into the release a provision which
made Plantation responsible for repairing any damage to Ste-
ven's property." Satisfied with the change, Stevens signed the
grant and release. The agent, however, had her sign the copy of
the release that did not contain the handwritten insertion. He left
the unsigned modified release with Stevens and took the signed
copy without the modification. After the work was in progress and
Stevens objected to the manner in which it was being done, she
realized that she had signed the wrong form.
In order to succeed in an action for fraud and deceit in South
Carolina, the plaintiff must prove that:
[The agent [of defendant] . . . made a material misrepre-
sentation; that it was false; that when it was made the agent
knew it was false; that it was made with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the [plaintiff] ... ; that the
[plaintiff] . . . was ignorant of its falsity; that he relied on its
46. The court in Hinds did not make a finding concerning the authority of La-Z-Boy's
salesman; thus, lack of authority cannot be considered a basis for granting the summary
judgment. Id. The law of agency, however, is still applicable to UCC transactions unless
displaced by a specific UCC provision. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-103 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
47. 260 S.C. 390, 196 S.E.2d 117 (1973).
48. "Timber will be cut and placed along R/W for owner use. Terraces & pastures
will be replaced to present conditions as nearly as practicable after construction. This




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
truth; that he had a right to rely thereon; and that he thereby
suffered injury."
Fraud and deceit must be distinguished from a breach of contract
or unfulfilled promises. Neither will support an action for fraud
and deceit unless the promise or contract was made without the
intention of performing."
The circuit court granted Plantation's motion for nonsuit
because it felt that the provisions of the modification were "mere
future promises the breach of which would not support an action
for fraud."'" In reversing, the supreme court rejected the circuit
court's view of the fraud. It held that the alleged fraud was in the
agent's tricking Stevens into signing a release whose terms dif-
fered from those upon which the parties had agreed.
Adoption of this view of the fraud and deceit was not suffi-
cient to dispose of the case; the court had to consider whether
Stevens was barred from recovery because of failure to take steps
to protect herself from fraud. The plaintiff in an action for fraud
and deceit must prove that he had the right to rely on the misre-
presentation of the defendant.2 A part of this requirement is that
the complainant must establish that he took advantage of avail-
able means to protect himself from fraud.5 3 Requiring proof of a
right to rely on a misrepresentation is to further a judicial policy
of discouraging negligence by parties who enter into commercial
transactions and protecting contracts by reducing the opportun-
ity for fraud." At the same time, however, courts do not want to
protect someone who has defrauded another." As an accommoda-
tion between these two competing interests, South Carolina has
adopted a negligence standard that is applied to the defrauded
party." If the defrauded party's conduct in failing to look out for
his own interests amounts to negligence, he is barred from recov-
ery because he had no right to rely on the other party's misrepre-
sentations." In determining whether the person allegedly de-
49. Davis v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 290-91, 157 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1967).
50. Id. at 291, 293, 157 S.E.2d at 568-69.
51. Stevens v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 260 S.C. 390, 394-95, 196 S.E.2d 117, 119
(1973).
52. Davis v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 290-91, 157 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1967).
53. J.B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 234-35, 123 S.E. 845, 848 (1924).
54. Id. at 232, 123 S.E. at 847.
55. Id.
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frauded is negligent, his conduct is compared to that of a person
of the same intelligence, experience and age under similar cir-
cumstances. s
Normally a person who does not read the document which he
signs is barred from recovery,59 although failure to read the docu-
ment is sometimes excused due to the low intelligence or lack of
education of the individual." In the present case, Stevens read
the release after the pen changes had been made, but then the
agent had her sign a copy of the release which did not contain the
additions. Although she did not read the specific document she
signed, the supreme court held that this failure did not prevent
her from maintaining the suit. The court did not excuse the fail-
ure to read because of any disability of Stevens, but it evidently
felt that she had exercised due care to ascertain the contents of
the document she was to sign. The case was remanded for the jury
to determine whether plaintiff had been justified in relying on the
agent's representation that the paper she signed was the one that
he had modified.
Another question in Stevens was whether the agent had au-
thority to make changes to the mimeographed forms he presented
to Stevens. The grant of right-of-way contained the following
statement: "It is understood and acknowledged by the under-
signed that the person securing this grant is without authority to
make any agreement in regard to the subject matter hereof which
is not expressed herein, and that no such agreement will be bind-
ing on the Grantee."6
This statement has two possible interpretations. It might
mean that the agent had no authority to make any agreements
for his principal other than those that the principal had printed
on the documents. Alternatively, it could mean that the agent
had authority to make agreements not printed on the documents,
but to bind Plantation any additional agreements must have
been written on the mimeographed forms. Evidently referring to
the latter interpretation, the supreme court dismissed the issue
raised by Plantation by stating: "The short answer is that there
is no agreement to be varied until execution; and that any provi-
sion written into either of the two simultaneously executed in-
58. Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 467, 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1965).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Brief for Respondent at 12, Stevens v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 260 S.C. 390,
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struments prior to execution would have become part of the inte-
grated grant. 62 With this interpretation, of course, the clause
would not prevent Stevens' recovery.
The implications of the court's "short answer" for the new
trial granted are not clear. The court might have meant that since
there were two possible interpretations of the clause, one of which
would not bar Stevens' recovery, Plantation's motion for nonsuit
should not have been granted by the lower court and the jury
should determine the correct interpretation at the new trial. On
the other hand, the "short answer" might have meant that the
court decided that the meaning it assigned to the clause was the
correct one and that on this point there would be no issue to
submit to the jury at the new trial. However, in view of the fact
that the clause could have two plausible meanings and in view
of the fact that Stevens did read the grant, a jury should deter-
mine whether the clause is a bar to Stevens' recovery.
MICHAEL 0. JOHNSON
62. 260 S.C. 390, 395, 196 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1973).
[Vol. 26
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